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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ANTITRUST-SHERMAN ACT-NETWORK SPONSORSHIP PRACTICES
ARE TYING AGREEMENTS IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 1.
American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount
Theatres, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 1963)
The original action was instituted by American Manufacturers' Mutual
Insurance Company (hereinafter Kemperer) for treble damages and injunc-
tive relief for an alleged violation of section one of the Sherman Act' by
American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. (hereinafter ABC).
Plaintiff sought sponsorship of a news program called "Evening Report"
that was televised on defendant's network. Kemperer alleged that it desired
to purchase sponsorship over 95 of ABC's affiliated network stations, as
these were all that were required for its business purposes. ABC, however,
required that Kemperer purchase or pay for sponsorship over a total of
130 stations. Kemperer alleged ABC's demands to purchase these addi-
tional 35 stations constituted a tying agreement repugnant to the anti-
trust laws. The court denied defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint
pursuant to rule 12(b)6 2 and its alternative motion to strike certain para-
graphs of the complaint and certain prayers for relief pursuant to rule
12(f),3 holding in effect that defendant's practice was in violation of the
Sherman Act. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-
Paramount Theatres, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
Tying arrangements have often been defined by the courts,4 but in
each instance two separate and distinct products have been involved.5 For,
1. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal.... 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15
U.S.C., § 1 (1958).
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)6. In order for the complaint to withstand ABC's
motion to dismiss, plaintiff must allege facts which if proven would constitute a
violation of the Sherman Act.
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
4. See, e.g., definition set out infra note 8.
5. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6, 78 S.Ct. 514,
518 (1957), involving the leasing or deeding of railroad property on condition that the
grantees and lessees ship products obtained from the land on the railroad; Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06, 69 S.Ct. 1051, 1058 (1949), herein
the agreement conditioned the sale of gasoline upon the purchase of all other necessary
automotive accessories such as, tires, batteries, and the like; United States v.
Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 156-59, 68 S.Ct. 915, 928-29 (1948), where the
licensing of one feature or group of features was conditioned on the exhibitor also
licensing another feature or group of features released by the distributor during a
given period; Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. D. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653, 655 (1st
Cir. 1961), there the court held a refusal to sell certain unloaders where they were
not to be installed in presently-purchased or already owned silos of the seller's own
manufacture was not in violation of the antitrust laws.
(492)
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although "a seller may attempt to persuade his purchaser to buy his products
rather than those of a competitor, he will run afoul of the antitrust laws
only when the sale of one product (the tying product) is made under an
agreement, arrangement or condition under which the buyer must also
purchase another product (the tied) product."6 The purchaser is thereby
forced to buy the undesired product to obtain that which is desired. This
tends to restrain competition in the tied product.7
Tying agreements have traditionally been in violation of the Clayton
Act," but it was not until International Salt Co. v. United States,9 that the
Court held that the tie-in of the sale of one product to that of another
was a per se violation of section one of the Sherman Act. In Standard Oil
Co. v. United States,10 an action involving section three of the Clayton Act,
the Court again expressed its displeasure with these conditioned sales
stating that such agreements could hardly serve any purpose other than
the suppression of competition.
International Salt was the harbinger of a series of decisions which
gradually set forth the elements of an illegal tying arrangement. There, an
agreement in violation of the Sherman Act and in fact a tie-in arrange-
ment was found where the seller held patents over the tying product
giving it a legal monopoly, while it maintained a "dominance" over the tied
product." The following year, however, in a case which also involved a
legal monopoly resulting from certain copyrights, the Court advanced the
proposition that a more appropriate standard would be "distinctiveness"
of the tying product. 12 Subsequently the Court decided that agreements to
violate section one of the Sherman Act must meet both tests set forth by
the narrow standards of section three of the Clayton Act. 3 Four years
later, in 1957, the Supreme Court specifically stated that the rule of per se
unreasonableness would apply to all tying agreements in which the defen-
dant (1) had sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product
6. Osborne v. Sinclair Refining Co., 286 F.2d 832,836 (4th Cir. 1960).
7. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 514 (1957).
8. When the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in the market for the "tying"
product, or if a substantial volume of commerce in the "tied" product is restrained,
a tying arrangement violates the narrow standards expressed in § 3 of the Clayton
Act .... And because for even a lawful monopolist it is 'unreasonable, per se,
to foreclose competitors from any substantial market,' a tying agreement is
banned by § 1 of the Sherman Act whenever both conditions are met.
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-09, 73 S.Ct. 872,
880 (1953) ; see also 15 U.S.C., §§ 12-27 (1963).
9. 332 U.S. 392, 68 S.Ct. 12 (1947). However, this rule had been previously
suggested in Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680,
684, 64 S.Ct. 278, 280 (1944) (dictum).
10. 337 U.S. 293, 305, 69 S.Ct. 1051, 1058 (1949).
11. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 68 S.Ct. 12 (1947).
Dominance was shown in that defendant had a limited monopoly by patent over the
two machines in question and was the nation's largest producer of salt.
12. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 68 S.Ct. 915 (1948).
The criterion of distinctiveness was necessary since defendant held no monopoly
by patent nor was it the largest producer of films in the nation, but, the distinctiveness
of each feature and its protection by copyright was what made it desirable and gave
the distributor the necessary leverage to induce the buyer to agree.
13. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 73 S.Ct. 872
(1953). See supra note*8.
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giving him the ability to impose an appreciable restraint on free competi-
tion in the tied product,, and (2) that a not insubstantial amount of inter-
state commerce would be affected.' 4 The Court further expanded the test
applied to the tying product holding that desirability and uniqueness of
the product are sufficient to satisfy the test.15
However, previously, in 1956, the Court had shown that it never
receded from its position on the rule of reason, 16 holding that "it is logical
that some agreements and practices are invalid per se while others are
illegal only applied to particular situations."'17 Relying on this, it was
recently held that the per se rule is not binding "as to any set of facts not
basically the same as those in the case in which the rule was applied."' 8
The initial problem that must be faced in the instant case is how to
distinguish the tying product from the tied product. Plaintiff contended
that there were in fact two separate tying agreements: "(1) the tie-in of
35 undesired stations to 95 desired stations and (2) the tie-in of sponsor-
ship on 35 undesired stations to the basic sponsorship of the unique program
"Evening Report."' 9 The defendant relied heavily on the reasoning of
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 20 which would seem to
exclude the present agreement from the classification of tying agreements.
There it was decided that the conditioning of sale of advertising space in
one of two newspapers owned by the same publisher on purchase of space
in the second was not a tying agreement. The basic premise advanced
was that for all practical purposes the products were identical and the
market the same. 2 1 It is difficult to reconcile this court's holding the present
agreement to be a tying agreement with the Supreme Court's earlier
reluctance to find any product distinction between a morning and an evening
edition of a newspaper.
In Times-Picayune, although two newspapers were involved, the Court
considered the sole product to be access to the general reading public.
22
Similarly here, though two groups of stations have been designated, the
sole product seems to be sponsorship of one television show. Kemperer
itself acknowledged that it entered into the contract with ABC to purchase
the sponsorship of the unique program "Evening Report." Therefore, as
had been suggested in a previous case,23 Kemperer was purchasing "the
14. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6, 78 S.Ct. 514,
518 (1951).
15. See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 83 S.Ct. 97 (1962).
16. This involves searching the entire record for unreasonable restraint of trade
rather than classifying the agreement as a violation on its face.
17. United States v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 387, 76
S.Ct. 994, 1002 (1956).
18. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 556 (E.D. Pa.
1960), aff'd, 365 U.S. 567, 81 S.Ct. 755 (1961).
19. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres,
Inc., 221 F. Supp. 848, 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
20. 345 U.S. 594, 73 S.Ct. 872 (1953).
21. Id. at 614, 73 S.Ct. at 884.
22. Ibid.
23. Columbia Broadcasting v. Amana Refrigerationj Inc., 295 F.2d 375 (7th Cir.
1961), cert. den., 369 U.S. 812, 82 S.Ct. 689 (1962).
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privilege of having itself identified as sponsor of the program broadcast
and making use of the permissible portion thereof for advertising its
products." 24 This agreement then could be a question of the quantity of a
product that the seller desires to make available to the producer as dis-
tinguished from the sale of a desired, dominant product on condition that
the purchaser acquire a second, distinct product. Kemperer negotiated with
ABC to avail itself of the network facilities and then attempted to dictate
to ABC just how much of the network exposure it would purchase. If,
indeed, plaintiff was attempting to buy advertising time on certain stations
and was being forced to buy time on unwanted stations, it could have
negotiated with the individual stations to buy advertising spots between
regularly sponsored network programs. Instead, Kemperer, wishing to
identify itself with "Evening Report," negotiated with ABC for purchase
of the show's sponsorship, but only on Kemperer's terms. Plaintiff could
just as easily have demanded that it only pay for sponsorship of ten stations
or, to the extreme, only one station. If ABC refused, it could be implied
from the language of this decision, that sufficient facts would be present
to allege a violation of the Sherman Act. Such a result would be un-
fortunate as it could well lead to the end of the network television; financing
network programs would prove to be difficult, if not impossible.25
The practices of some networks have already been subject to a great
deal of criticism. The main brunt of this criticism has been directed at
a practice called the "must buy" arrangement under which a network
designates a minimum lineup of affiliated stations as "basic required"
stations, and makes no sale of television station time to an advertiser unless
the advertiser ordered all of the stations on the "basic required" lineup.2 6
The House Committee considered this practice to fall within the category
of tying agreements, with the wanted stations designated as the tying
product under the Northern Pacific rationale without looking further into
dominance or monopoly.27 Professor Donald Turner, testifying before the
24. Id. at 378.
25. However, this is not to say that all network practices would be lawful or
above reproach. But cf. John Wright & Assoc., Inc. v. Ullrich, 203 F. Supp. 744,
751 (D. Minn. 1962). The court stated that "acts which only incidently or indirectly
restrict competition, while their principal purpose and effect is .the reasonable
advancement of legitimate purposes, are not prohibited" by the antitrust statutes.
26. Report of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Network
Broadcasting, H.R. RP. 1297, 85th Cong., 2d Se~s. 512 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
Network Broadcasting].
27. Ibid. The report further stated:
A network employing the 'must buy' practice imposes the requirement that
the advertiser take a second commodity (one or more unwanted basic stations)
in order to obtain the wanted 'tying' product (those network affiliates in markets
desired by the advertiser). Since the 'must buy' practice does require the
advertiser to purchase all of the basic stations in order to gain access to the
network, those stations basic or optional, wanted by the advertiser, constitute
the dominant 'tying' product under the Northern Pacific rationale. It is irrelevant
that there are other TV stations affiliated with other networks or independently
operated, or even that there are competing TV stations in many markets in which
the network has a basic or optional station which the advertiser wants to buy.
Hence, there is no necessity for relying upon the 'monopoly' one station markets
in which the network has an affiliate, basic or optional, which the advertiser
SPRING 1964]
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Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, felt that these acts
would clearly be "an unreasonable restraint on trade."28
These operations, however, have been attributed to the other two
major networks and not to ABC. "ABC has never had a regular 'must
buy' group of stations in its television operations"; it merely imposes
upon the advertisers a "minimum dollar requirement" whereby they must
purchase a minimum amount of program time at ABC's rates for its various
affiliated stations.29 In fact both the Senate and House Committee recom-
mended that the other two networks change their policy to conform to that
of ABC.30 Such a "minimum dollar requirement" would solve the networks'
problems and represent just compensation for use of network facilities.31
The court in the present action, however, has intimated that it would
consider even this "minimum dollar requirement" in violation of the Sher-
man Act,32 relying on language in United States v. Loew's, Inc.3 3 Loew's
wants in order to show the requisite leverage. Further, the proportion of the
television advertising market controlled by the network to the total advertising
market is also irrelevant as is the necessity for showing adverse competitive
effects resulting from the 'tie-in' aspects of the 'must buy' practice. It may be
reiterated that even if all of the unwanted stations are in large, metropolitan
markets where several competing stations operate, all of the basic stations, whether
in one-station or multi-station markets, are forced upon the advertiser. This prac-
tice thus would seem to fit squarely within the Northern Pacific 'tie-in' formula.
For a complete study of network practices see Schwartz, Antitrust and the F.C.C., TheProblem of Network Dominance, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 753 (1959) ; Turner, The Validity
of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. Rrv. 50 (1958).
28. The "must buy" arrangements . . . foreclose independent TV stations from
access to programs, and again foreclose small advertisers from an opportunity
to purchase prime television time. Again we would conclude that, even apart
irom the movie cases - I mean just on general anti-trust principles - this would
be clearly an unreasonable restraint on trade ...
Hcarings on Television Inquiry Before Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1559 (1956) (testimony of Professor Donald Turner).
29. Network Broadcasting at 474.
30. Id. at 524-25. There two recommendations are presented (1) "elimination
of the must buy requirements and (2) modification along the lines of the ABC
requirement." The Committee went further to say that:
it would be reasonable, therefore, to proscribe the present "must buy" requirement
of CBS and NBC, which require the order of specific stations, but to permit an
aggregate minimum requirement. Such a requirement might take one of several
forms, such as: a minimum dollar requirement (the present ABC practice); a
minimum number of stations; or a minimum percentage of the total network (as
measured by the aggregate of station rates or of station circulation).
See also STAFF oF SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess.; REPORT ON TELEVISION NETWORK PRACTIcEs 42 (Comm. Print 1957)
[hereinafter cited as SENATE STAFF REPORT].
31. SENATE STAFF REPORT at 42:
(1) The must buy practice does serve to bar local and regional advertisers
from networks. This is necessary to provide a national circulation needed to
sustain quality programming and to provide sufficient revenues from time charges
to pay the networks' interconnection charges and support their news, sustaining,
and public-affairs activities.
(2) The requirement that an advertiser purchase a specified list of stations
imposed by NBC and CBS, however, seems possibly to discriminate against
affiliates not on the list and to force national advertisers to conform to rigid
patterns which may not fit their individual needs. It, therefore, might appear that
a minimum dollar purchase would serve all the legitimate needs of the networks
in this area and should be substituted for the must-buy practice now in use.
32. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres,
Inc., 221 F. Supp. 848, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Even if plaintiffs were not required to
take the additional 35 stations, but would be forced, if they chose not to, to pay a
disproportionately high rate for the 95 ostations, this too would constitute a violation.
33. 371 U.S. 38, 54, 83 S.Ct. 97, 106-07 (1963).
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and the line of cases which preceded it involve the standard block-booking
practices where the buyer was purchasing one film on the condition that
certain others were bought; there two distinct products were involved. 34
A further suggestion of the House Committee was that the networks
institute a type of block or group booking policy. This requirement the
Committee thought reasonable and satisfactory to all interests.35
It appears that this decision might cause destruction of the major
television networks. The production of a network show involves a great
deal of financial backing. If a sponsor can completely dictate what stations he
wishes his sponsorship to be carried, there can be no degree of certainty that
the network can acquire the financial backing necessary to finance the show.
It is not unreasonable to require an advertiser that wishes to be identified
with a specific program and avail itself of the network facilities to com-
pensate the network for this privilege. The "minimum dollar requirement"
seems the most reasonable solution short of outright sale of the program,
but both practices would seem to meet the disfavor of the court. It must be
remembered, however, that the court stated that "with the law in flux, this
is all the more reason, for denying a motion to dismiss. . .. "36
The sweeping decision of the court definitely classifies the alleged
agreement as a tying agreement in violation of the Sherman Act. At trial,
the court will have an opportunity to review the many aspects of this
agreement which should have been considered before it was rendered
invalid. In particular, more evidenice than that produced on the motion
is necessary to settle the important question as to whether ABC actually
follows a "must buy" practice. The present proceeding having arisen only
on a motion to dismiss, the court may reverse itself at trial and find the
agreement not prohibited by the actY.7
Jack J. Bernstein
34. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 68 S.Ct. 915
(1948). But see Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 564, 73
S.Ct. 872 (1953), where the Court held that Times' refusal to sell was not alone a
Sherman Act violation.
35. See Network Broadcasting at 525; SENATE STAPP REPORT at 42.
36. Manufacturers Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres.
Inc., 221 F. Supp. 848, 851 (1963).
37. Before this agreement can be declared to be in violation of the antitrust laws,
a great many factors must be considered and important issues decided. The initial
problem that must be faced by the court is whether a network television program is
to be considered as a single package or unit or whether the two groups of stations
are to be considered as separate distinct products. From here it would become
necessary to delve into the actual practices of the networks. The following are only
some of the factors that might require exploration:
(1) Whether ABC has in fact instituted a must buy procedure such as that
attributed to the other two major networks.
(2) Whether the must buy practice is in fact in violation of the antitrust laws.
In deciding this, the court would have to investigate into the business
necessity of such a practice. There are the questions of necessity to unity and
identity of the network and the necessity of a stable programming practice
to preserve the marketability of the product offered by the network. However,
SPRING 1964]
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